Advanced Search

Journal Navigation

Journal Home

Subscriptions

Archive

Contact Us

Table of Contents

CiteULike is a free service for managing and discovering scholarly references - click here to get started.

Sign In to gain access to subscriptions and/or personal tools.
Emotion Review
This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow References
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Right arrow Citation Map
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to Saved Citations
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Right arrow Request Reprints
Right arrow Add to My Marked Citations
Citing Articles
Right arrow Citing Articles via HighWire
Right arrow Citing Articles via Scopus
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Castelfranchi, C.
Right arrow Articles by Miceli, M.
Social Bookmarking
Add to CiteULike   Add to Complore   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us   Add to Digg   Add to Reddit   Add to Technorati   Add to Twitter  
What's this?

The Cognitive-Motivational Compound of Emotional Experience

Cristiano Castelfranchi

Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, National Research Council of Italy, cristiano.castelfranchi{at}istc.cnr.it

Maria Miceli

Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies, National Research Council of Italy

We present an analysis of emotional experience in terms of beliefs and desires viewed as its minimal cognitive constituents. We argue that families of emotions can be identified because their members share some of these constituents. To document this claim, we analyze one family of emotions—which includes the feeling of inferiority, admiration, envy, and jealousy—trying to show that the distinctiveness of each emotion is due to the specific compound of beliefs and desires it implies, whereas the kinship among related emotions is due to their sharing of cognitive or motivational components. Finally, we address the gestalt problem, that is, the question of how it is possible that emotions, although consisting of several "atomic" elements, are felt as unitary experiences.

Key Words: belief • cognitive compound • desire • emotional gestalt

Emotion Review, Vol. 1, No. 3, 223-231 (2009)
DOI: 10.1177/1754073909103590
Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Complore Complore   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us   Add to Digg Digg   Add to Reddit Reddit   Add to Technorati Technorati   Add to Twitter Twitter    What's this?


This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
 Emotion ReviewHome page
R. Reisenzein
Emotional Experience in the Computational Belief-Desire Theory of Emotion
Emotion Review, July 1, 2009; 1(3): 214 - 222.
[Abstract] [PDF]

Home page
 Emotion ReviewHome page
S. A. Doring
The Logic of Emotional Experience: Noninferentiality and the Problem of Conflict Without Contradiction
Emotion Review, July 1, 2009; 1(3): 240 - 247.
[Abstract] [PDF]

Home page
 Emotion ReviewHome page
M. Siemer
Mood Experience: Implications of a Dispositional Theory of Moods
Emotion Review, July 1, 2009; 1(3): 256 - 263.
[Abstract] [PDF]